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Fear generalization, in which conditioned fear responses
generalize or spread to related stimuli, is a defining feature of
anxiety disorders. The behavioral consequences of maladap-
tive fear generalization are that aversive experiences with
one stimulus or event may lead one to regard other cues
or situations as potential threats that should be avoided,
despite variations in physical form. Theoretical and empir-
ical interest in the generalization of conditioned learning
dates to the earliest research on classical conditioning in
nonhumans. Recently, there has been renewed focus on
fear generalization in humans due in part to its explanatory
power in characterizing disorders of fear and anxiety. Here,
we review existing behavioral and neuroimaging empirical
research on the perceptual and non-perceptual (conceptual
and symbolic) generalization of fear and avoidance in
healthy humans and patients with anxiety disorders. The
clinical implications of this research for understanding the
etiology and treatment of anxiety is considered and direc-
tions for future research described.
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FEAR IS A REMARKABLY ADAPTIVE BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE,
allowing us to predict, react, and adjust to past,
present, and future threat. Fear learning may,
however, go awry or become excessive and lead
to the development of psychopathology. In exper-
imental psychopathology, the behavioral mecha-
nisms of fear learning are investigated using the
fear-conditioning paradigm—perhaps the most
well-established translational model of the acquisi-
tion of clinically relevant fear and anxiety (Beckers,
Krypotos, Boddez, Effting, & Kindt, 2013; Boddez,
Baeyens, Hermans, & Beckers, 2014; Bouton,
2002; Craske, Hermans, & Vansteenwegen, 2006;
Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). Fear-conditioning
involves an initially neutral stimulus (the condi-
tioned stimulus or CS), such as a light or a tone,
being repeatedly paired with an aversive uncon-
ditioned stimulus (US). After only a few CS-US
pairings, presentations of the CS alone will elicit a
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conditioned fear response (CR) assessed in humans
using measures of physiological arousal, response
tendencies (e.g., freezing), or expectancy ratings.
This basic paradigm has proven enormously
successful in advancing knowledge of the neurobe-
havioral mechanisms involved in the acquisition,
expression, and regulation of fear specifically and
emotional behavior more generally (Craske et al.,
2006; LeDoux, 2014; Vervliet & Raes, 2013).
As an illustrative example, consider an individual
diagnosed with panic disorder defined by recurrent
and unexpected panic attacks, heightened emotional
arousal and an intense fear of future or anticipated
attacks. Such individuals may have previously ex-
perienced an attack (theUS) in a public place (theCS)
and, as a result, come to experience derivatives of
these conditioned fear responses and avoid situations
associated with panic attacks.
Fear responses are considered excessive or in-
dicative of psychopathology when the continuum
of intensity increases; that is, when the CR occurs
at such a high level and with escalating frequency
that ongoing behavior is impaired and results in
avoidance of the fearful stimuli. The underlying
neurobehavioral mechanisms supporting this tran-
sition from adaptive fear learning to clinical fear,
avoidance, and anxiety are now well understood
thanks to the fear-conditioning paradigm (Beckers
et al., 2013; Lissek et al., 2005; Vervliet & Raes,
2013). But fear learning is rarely (if ever) limited to
those specific instances or events in which condi-
tioning occurred. Instead, a range of related objects,
situations, and events that resemble the aversive
learning experience come to elicit fear as well. This
generalization of conditioned fear shows that CRs
are often elicited by stimuli not associated with the
aversive event but which resemble the CS along a
formal, perceptual dimension (Honig & Urcuioli,
1981). The study of stimulus generalization pro-
cesses like this has a long history of research in both
Pavlovian and instrumental/operant conditioning
(e.g., Hull, 1943; McLaren & Mackintosh, 2002;
Pavlov, 1927), but has only recently been extended
to fear generalization in humans (Dunsmoor,Mitroff,
& LaBar, 2009; Lissek et al., 2008, 2010; Vervliet,
Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, Hermans, & Eelen, 2005;
Vervliet, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 2004).
The relevance of fear generalization to experi-
mental psychopathology research on fear and
anxiety is illustrated by returning to our example
of panic disorder. An individual who experiences
a panic attack while riding a train may associate
a host of information with the experience that is
not limited to trains. For instance, he or she may
express fear and avoidance when confronted with
perceptually related cues or situations, such as all
enclosed spaces (e.g., a bathroom stall, being stuck
in traffic, or inside an MRI scanner), other forms of
transportation (e.g., buses, trams, subways, cars), or
situations in which mechanical sounds and move-
ment are experienced (e.g., on an escalator). Neither
is fear generalization confined to external stimuli: if
the individual experienced a racing heartbeat when
experiencing the panic attack, then other internal
sensations like feeling a tight chest, a numb feeling in
the arms, or spells of dizziness might each acquire the
potential to evoke fear (Bouton, Mineka, & Barlow,
2001; Lissek et al., 2010). In addition to perceptually
related stimuli, generalization might involve classes
of symbolically related cues. For instance, a person
suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder might
initially avoid chemicals like herbicides and pesti-
cides for fear of contaminating their child. The set
of perceived threats may gradually expand to in-
clude knives, syringes, dirty objects, and cigarette
butts (Kaczkurkin & Lissek, 2013). Although none
of these stimuli share strong perceptual related-
ness, they are all part of an idiosyncratic category
of cues of potential danger to the health of the
sufferer’s young child for whom she experiences
excessive responsibility.
Fear generalization is a defining feature of anx-
iety disorders such that the focus of fear becomes
excessive and unrestricted, extending to a whole
class of objects, persons, and situations (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013; Craske et al., 2009,
Lissek, 2012). This perceptual and nonperceptual
generalization means that aversive experiences with
one exemplar may lead people to infer that classes
of related cues are fearful, dangerous, and need to
be avoided, despite their physical differences. As
a result, the clinically anxious individual comes to
fear, and avoid, all potentially threatening objects
and situations, leading to impairment in social
functioning and diminished quality of life (Craske
et al., 2009). This broadening of stimuli that come
to elicit fear and anxiety can involve mechanisms
of stimulus generalization as traditionally described
in the conditioned learning literature, as detailed in
this review.
In the present article,we review existingbehavioral
and neuroimaging empirical research on the percep-
tual and nonperceptual (conceptual and symbolic)
generalization of fear and avoidance, and its rele-
vance to anxiety disorders. We also evaluate the
current status and future direction of research on fear
and avoidance generalization and describe clinical
and therapeutic implications. It is important to
note that the present review is only concerned with
research conducted with humans using the fear-
conditioning and generalization paradigm. As a
result, related nonhuman neurophysiology research
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on generalization (e.g., Ciocchi et al., 2010;
Kheirbek, Klemenhagen, Sahay, & Hen, 2012),
human work on generalization of nonfear learning
(e.g., Schechtman, Laufer, & Paz, 2010) or on the
role of environmental factors in generalization
(e.g., Pace-Shott et al., 2009) will not be considered
here. Further, learning theory models of stimulus
generalization and discrimination constitute a sub-
stantial literature that cannot be covered here due
to space constraints (see, for example, McLaren &
Mackintosh, 2002).
Perceptual Fear Generalization
In perceptual generalization, conditioned responses
established to a sensory stimulus (CS+; e.g., a spe-
cific light, sound, or shape) are elicited to some
degree by other stimuli, often tested using stimuli
along the same perceptual dimension (e.g., other
lights, sounds, or shapes, respectively) (Hermans,
Baeyens, & Vervliet, 2013; Kalish, 1969).
demonstration and empirical analysis of
fear generalization along perceptual
similarity
Pavlov (1927) first noted that CRs may be elicited
by stimuli that share perceptual similarity with the
original CS. Many early studies of stimulus general-
ization incorporated an appetitive (i.e., rewarding)
US, like food, but an early animal demonstration of
what we would today regard as fear generalization
includes Beritoff’s (1924) work on withdrawal re-
flexes. The first demonstration of fear generalization
in humans was by Hovland (1937). First, in acqui-
sition, one of four equidistant tones was contingently
paired with an electric shock presented to the left
wrist. Then, in the generalization test, the four
tones were presented again and skin conductance
responses (SCRs)were recorded. In linewithPavlov’s
observation of generalization in an appetitive prep-
aration, Hovland observed that the three tones that
were never contingently paired with the US, but
were perceptually similar to the CS, also elicited fear
responses. Moreover, the responses to these gener-
alization stimuli decreased as a function of percep-
tual similarity (higher or lower in tone frequency).
This response decrement is visualized as a logarith-
mic curve and is now widely known as a generaliza-
tion gradient. The generalization response gradient is
generally centered at the reinforced stimulus (CS+)
and diminishes as a function of perceptual similarity
to the CS+ along the sensory dimension (Ghirlanda&
Enquist, 2003; Honig & Urcuioli, 1981).
Hovland (1937, p. 136) first noted that the form
of the gradient is an important indicator of learning
and generalization, with a broad gradient taken to
reflect widespread generalization or poor stimulus
control, whereas a sharp gradient centered on the
CS+ can be taken to reflect discrimination or strong
stimulus control. As we shall see, the shape of the
gradient can also provide individual difference mea-
sures (e.g., clinical status of the participants) and
reflect the impact of different experimental manipu-
lations (e.g., verbal instructions).
empirical demonstrations of perceptual
generalization gradients
Contemporary generalization research in humans
has been inspired by conditioning-based models of
clinical anxiety (e.g., Lissek et al., 2008, Vervliet,
Kindt, Vansteenwegen, & Hermans, 2010b). In the
first contemporary systematic examination of fear
generalization gradients in humans, Lissek et al.
(2008) showed gradients of the eye-blink startle
reflex to rings that varied in size from a ring paired
with shock (CS+). The eye-blink (or fear-potentiated)
startle reflex is an electromyographic response to
a sudden stimulus that is potentiated in the presence
of threat or during a state of anxiety, relative to a
quiescent state (Grillon, 2008). During the acquisi-
tion phase, Lissek et al. (2008) used a small and a
large sized ring as CS+ and CS-, respectively. An
electric shock US followed the CS+ on 9 of the 12
trials (75% reinforcement schedule), while the CS-
was never followed by shock (rings serving as CS+
and CS- were counterbalanced across partici-
pants). To test whether conditioned fear general-
ized from the CS+ to other perceptual stimuli, eight
different unreinforced rings, ranging in size be-
tween the CS+ and CS-, were used as generalization
stimuli (GSs). During the generalization test, startle
responses to the GSs were tested. Fear responses
were observed for stimuli that visually approxi-
mated the CS+, and the strength of the fear
responses gradually decreased as the GSs became
more dissimilar from the CS+, producing a decre-
mented generalization gradient of conditioned fear
responses.
In a follow-up study, Lissek et al. (2010)
demonstrated that patients suffering from panic
disorder (PD) displayed shallower, linear decreases
in generalization than the healthy control group.
Lissek et al. noted the generalization of conditioned
fear of up to three increments of CS+ differentiation
in PDpatients, but by only one increment in controls.
This pattern of responding, referred to as overgen-
eralization, is defined by less steep decreases in fear
responses as stimuli differentiate from CS+, indicat-
ing stronger generalization and the tendency to infer
threat-potential to physically similar stimuli. Over-
generalization has been observed in several clinical
groups including PD (Lissek et al., 2010), generalized
anxiety disorder (GAD; Lissek, Kaczkurkin, et al.,
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2014), and posttraumatic stress disorder (Lissek &
Grillon, 2012).
In a recent study, this fear generalization test
was embedded in an instrumental computer game
("virtual farmer") where shocks could be avoided
at the cost of poorer performance in the game (van
Meurs, Wiggert, Wicker, & Lissek, 2014). The
extent of generalization found with a measure of
Pavlovian conditioning (fear-potentiated startle)
correlated with generalization of the instrumental
response (avoidance). To our knowledge, the only
other study to have examined perceptual general-
ization of avoidance, as an instantiation of fear, is a
study by Lommen, Engelhard, and van den Hout
(2010). During acquisition, these authors used a
white and a black colored circle as CS+ and CS-,
respectively, of which the first was always termi-
nated by shock. During the generalization test,
circles with grey values that ranged between black
and white were presented as GSs. However, before
the start of this phase, participants were instructed
that shocks could be avoided within a latency of
1 or 5 s. Results showed that a preselected group
of participants who scored high on neuroticism
avoided shocks during this phase but only on the
5 s latency trials compared to the group scoring
low on neuroticism. Given that neuroticism is a risk
factor for clinical anxiety, these results are in line
with Lissek et al.’s (2010) demonstration of over-
generalization in PD.
Whereas most fear generalization studies have
employed aversive shock USs, two recent studies
used an aversive picture of a fearful screaming face as
the US,with theCS+ andCS- consisting of pictures of
neutral female faces. Haddad, Xu, Raeder, and Lau
(2013) predicted that this CS–US combination might
increase belongingness within the CS–US relation
and facilitate fear learning and generalization. This
"screaming lady" paradigm was tested with a group
of healthy young adults. After acquisition, general-
ization stimuli were presented, which consisted of
eight morphed pictures ranging in perceptual simi-
larity from the CS+ to the CS-. Significant general-
ization was observed in fear ratings as well as
fear-potentiated startle (see also Haddad, Pritchett,
Lissek, & Lau, 2012). Even though the combination
of a face displaying a fearful expression presented
simultaneously with a 95 dB female scream might
be less aversive than electric shock, this US has the
advantage that it might be more suitable for testing
younger age groups.
Glenn et al. (2012) tested healthy 8- to 13-year-
olds with a variant of this paradigm with the only
difference being that only one GS was used, which
was a 50% morphed blend of the CS+ and CS-
faces. Interestingly, there was a significant correla-
tion between age and the extent of fear acquisition
and generalization. Older children showed stronger
acquisition effects in the fear potentiated startle
response and exhibited more extensive generaliza-
tion in this measure of fear. These results are im-
portant in light of fear generalization as a potential
developmental or vulnerability risk factor for anxiety
disorders and highlight the transition fromchildhood
to early adolescence as a known high-risk period for
both anxiety andmooddisorders (Costello, Egger,&
Angold, 2005).
Fear generalization has also recently been
studied in the context of a voluntary movement-
conditioning paradigm in which one movement was
followed by shock, while a second movement was
not (Meulders & Vlaeyen, 2013). Subsequently,
participants were required tomake novel movements
that were either proprioceptively related or unrelated
to the original "painful" movement CS. It was found
that fear significantly generalized over this proprio-
ceptive dimension (see also, Meulders, Vandebroek,
Vervliet, & Vlaeyen, 2013).
neural substrates of the perceptual
generalization gradient
Neurobiological models of stimulus generalization
can be traced back to Pavlov’s neural irradiation
theory, which conceptualized generalization as a
result of spreading neurophysiological activity
across the cortex. Research on the neurobiology
of fear generalization in laboratory animals has
remained somewhat limited over the past century,
especially compared to research on direct forms of
fear conditioning. To date, the number of human
neuroimaging investigations of fear generalization
is small, but interest in the neurobehavioral mecha-
nisms underlying the generalization of conditioned
fear in humans has started to generate considerable
attention.
The first fMRI study of fear generalization in
humans incorporated a perceptual dimension of
emotional faces and demonstrated generalized
increases in activity to stimuli approximating the
CS+ within regions implicated in the acquisition
and expression of conditioned fear, including the
insula, caudate, and thalamus (Dunsmoor, Prince,
et al., 2011). The ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC), in contrast, showed generalized activity
to a stimulus approximating the CS- (see the section
on Intensity Generalization below for further
details). Greenberg et al. (2013a) examined fear
generalization using a perceptual dimension of
geometric shapes found generalized activity to
stimuli resembling the CS+ in the insula, caudate,
anterior cingulate cortex, and supplementary
motor cortex. Heightened activity in the vmPFC
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was observed to generalization test stimuli resem-
bling the CS-.
Greenberg et al. (2013b) investigated their fear
generalization paradigm with a group of patients
with generalized anxiety disorders (GAD). Func-
tional connectivity analyses focused on coupling
with the anterior insular (aINS), as the insula is
generally implicated in anxiety-specific neurobio-
logical deficits, including overexpression of fMRI
activity to learned threats or intrinsically anxiety-
provoking stimuli (Etkin &Wager, 2007; Paulus &
Stein, 2006). Connectivity analyses revealed in-
creased right aINS coupling with the right posterior
insula, ACC, amygdala and supplementary motor
area, in line with the idea that the aINS is a hub
where somatosensory and visceral input is integrat-
ed and relayed to other areas that guide fear-related
behaviors (ACC, amygdala, SMA).
Lissek, Bradford, et al. (2014) investigated the
brain mechanisms of fear generalization using a
version of the "rings of varying size" paradigm.
Results replicated previous fMRI investigations
of fear generalization in humans (Dunsmoor,
Prince, et al., 2011; Greenberg et al. 2013a,b),
revealing a ("positive") gradient in bilateral insula to
stimuli resembling the CS+, and a ("negative")
gradient in vmPFC to stimuli more closely approx-
imating theCS-. Positive gradientswere also found in
the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and bilateral
inferior parietal lobule, while negative gradients
were found in bilateral hippocampus and precuneus.
Functional connectivity analyses, using left and right
ventral hippocampus as seed regions, revealed
increased coupling with the amygdala and insula
during presentation of stimuli resembling the CS+,
and increased coupling with the vmPFC and the
precuneus during presentation of stimuli with the
least resemblance to the CS+.
Collectively, these findings suggest that fear
generalization engages similar neurocircuitry impli-
cated in the acquisition/expression (e.g., the insula
and ACC) and regulation (e.g., the vmPFC) of
conditioned fear. These results are generally in line
with a neurobiological model of fear generalization
outlined by Lissek (2012) and Lissek, Bradford,
et al. (2014) (see Figure 1) that incorporates a dual-
pathway hypothesis of fear learning and expression
centered on the amygdala, proposed by LeDoux
(1996). In this view, potentially threat-relevant
generalization stimuli that closely approximate the
CS+ may be relayed directly from the sensory
thalamus to the amygdala, bypassing sensory
cortex and thereby rapidly initiating the expression
of a conditioned fear response through output
connections with the insula, brainstem, and other
areas involved in the psychological and physiolog-
ical expression of fear. Fear generalization is also
mediated by the hippocampal complex, which
plays a role in pattern completion/pattern separa-
tion processes (see Gluck & Myers, 1993). Given
sufficient overlap between a generalization stimulus
and the CS+, the hippocampus initiates a pattern
completion process that reactivates the neural
representation of the CS, thereby initiating a con-
ditioned response. Insufficient overlap, on the other
hand, initiates pattern separation processes in the
hippocampus, which leads to activation of the
vmPFC that in turn down regulates the amygdala.
Hence, fear generalization can be viewed as balan-
cing excitation versus inhibition, which is determined
by pattern completion (generalization) versus pat-
tern separation (inhibition) processes. Evidence from
existing fMRI studies lends some support for this fear
generalization model, but the precise role of the
amygdala, hippocampal complex, medial prefrontal
cortex, and other regions in mediating fear general-
ization versus inhibition in humans requires further
investigation. In particular, the role of the human
amygdala in fear generalization remains unclear,
as previous fMRI studies have not detected robust
amygdala activity to GSs during generalization
testing. Clearly, further neuroimaging work on gen-
eralization is warranted.
experimental manipulations of fear
generalization along perceptual
similarity
In search of mechanisms that drive perceptual
generalization, behavioral research has started to
investigate the impact of experimental manipula-
tions on generalization. For instance, Vervliet,
Kindt, Vansteenwegen, and Hermans (2010a)
studied the impact of prior nonfearful experiences.
Participants were presented with a picture of a
triangle and a picture of a parallelogram, one of
which was contingently followed by shock.
During the generalization test, two generalization
stimuli were presented, which were sharper
versions of the triangle and parallelogram that
were presented during acquisition. Skin conduc-
tance responses and shock expectancy ratings
were obtained during both phases. Crucial to
this experiment, one group was preexposed to the
generalization stimuli (without shock) prior to
acquisition, whereas the control group was pre-
exposed to two irrelevant stimuli (arrow and
circle). The results showed significantly less
generalization in the preexposure group, suggest-
ing that prior nonfearful experiences can protect
against fear generalization. This finding has
relevance with respect to the prevention of
overgeneralization.
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Vervliet, Kindt, Vansteenwegen, and Hermans
(2010b) designed a procedure to test the hypothesis
that the extent to which the GS shares features
common with the CS will determine the level of
generalization observed. All participants were condi-
tioned to a yellow triangle, and were subsequently
presented with two generalization stimuli: a blue
triangle and a yellow square. The first GS only shared
the perceptual feature of shape (triangle), the second
the perceptual feature of color (yellow). Skin conduc-
tance and US-expectancy were recorded throughout
the experiment. The crucial manipulation in this
studywas that prior to conditioning participantswere
either informed that the shape of the stimuli would be
relevant in this experiment (SHAPE relevant group)
or that the color would be informative (COLOR
relevant group). As predicted, results showed that
generalization was strongest for the same shape
stimulus in the SHAPE group, and strongest for the
same color stimulus in the COLOR group.
FIGURE 1 Lissek, Bradford, et al.’s (2014) preliminary neural model of conditioned fear generalization. Following
acquisition of fear to CSþ, when exposed to a stimulus resembling CSþ (i.e. GS3), the thalamus is thought to relay
sensory information about GS3 to amygdala-based fear circuits via a "quick and dirty" route resulting in a fast initial fear
response to GS3. The thalamus simultaneously sends sensory GS3 information to visual cortices for higher level
sensory processing—a slower route through which neural representations of GS3 are activated in visual cortex. Next,
through hippocampally based "schematic matching," the overlap between patterns of brain activity representing GS3
and the previously encoded CS+ is assessed. Given sufficient overlap, CA3 neurons in hippocampus are thought
to initiate "pattern completion" (e.g., Treves & Rolls, 1994), whereby a subset of cues from a previous experience
(i.e. CS+) activates the stored pattern representing that experience. Pattern completion by the hippocampus is then
proposed to result in activation of brain structures associated with fear excitation (denoted in yellow: anterior insula,
dACC, amygdala), culminating in the autonomic, neuroendocrine and behavioral constituents of the fear response. In
the event of insufficient overlap between neural representations of GS3 and the CS+, dentate gyrus neurons in the
hippocampus are thought to initiate "pattern separation" (e.g. McHugh et al., 2007), resulting in the spread of
activation to structures associated with fear inhibition (denoted in blue: vmPFC). Such activations are then proposed
to attenuate ongoing activity in amygdala-based fear circuits initiated earlier by the "quick and dirty" route and serve
to stem anxious arousal. GS1, GS2, GS3 = ring-shaped generalization stimuli; CS+ =ring-shaped danger-cue; CS- =
ring shaped safety cue; vCS- = V-shaped safety cue; DG = dentate gyrus; CA3 = cornu ammonis region 3;
vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; dACC = dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; SMA = supplementary motor
cortex area. Reprinted from Lissek, Bradford, et al. (2014, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9, 1132-1142) by
permission of Oxford University Press and the author.
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A behavioral manipulation that investigates the
role of stimulus features can be found in Vervliet and
Geens (2014). Again, participants were conditioned
to a yellow triangle (CS+) and generalization was
tested for twoGS: a blue triangle anda yellow square.
Crucially, the nature of the CS- was manipulated
here. Depending on the nature of that stimulus, either
shape or color became essential for discrimination
learning during acquisition. For one group (COLOR
relevant), the CS- was a red triangle, whereas for
the second group (SHAPE relevant) the CS- was a
yellow circle. Results of online shock expectancies
and skin conductance responding showed that this
manipulation significantly impacted generalization.
Stronger fear responses were observed for the yellow
circle GS in the COLOR-relevant group, while more
fear was observed for the blue triangle GS in the
SHAPE-relevant group. Again, these results demon-
strate that fear generalization is influenced by feature
learning.
Another intriguing finding about how the nature
of the CS- can impact the shape of the generaliza-
tion curve was demonstrated by Dunsmoor and
LaBar (2013). In this experiment, the CS+ was a
circle of which the color was in the middle of the
green-blue color spectrum (near the point of sub-
jective equality between blue and green). For one
group of participants, the CS- was a clearly green
circle, while for the other group this was a clearly
blue circle (both were endpoints of the blue-green
dimension). Following discriminatory fear condi-
tioning between the CS+ and CS-, participants were
exposed to a series of unreinforced circles
that varied in color on the spectral wavelengths
below and above the CS+ (more green and more
blue). Opposing asymmetric generalization gradi-
ents were observed for the two groups that skewed
in a direction opposite the CS-. Postdiscrimination
shifts in the generalization gradient away from the
CS+ is known as a gradient shift (or peak-shift
effect), and has been observed in a number of lab-
oratory and ethology studies of animal behavior
(ten Cate & Rowe, 2007). Peak-shift effects can
explain response biases for generalized stimuli that
have never been reinforced, but contain features or
stimulus elements that are more extreme or unlike
an unreinforced stimulus. Peak-shift effects reveal
that individuals not only learn about the CS+ during
conditioning but also learn about the CS+ relative
to the CS-, inducing a postdiscrimination shift in
behavioral responses to stimuli that are more unlike
the CS-. Together with the studies by Vervliet et al.
(2010a, 2010b, 2014), these findings demonstrate
how experimental manipulations can impact the gen-
eralization curve, and help unveil processes under-
lying perceptual fear generalization.
individual differences in fear
generalization across perceptual
similarity
A major reason for the renewed interest in con-
ditioned fear generalization is its putative role in
the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders.
It has been proposed as a pathogenic marker of
anxiety disorders, with deviant behavioral, physi-
ological, and neural correlates (Lissek et al., 2008,
2010; Lissek, Bradford, et al., 2014; Lissek,
Kaczkurkin, et al., 2014). Various studies have
now shown that fear gradients vary with individual
difference variables that are relevant to anxiety.
Comparing Anxiety Patients and Healthy Controls
As described earlier, an important demonstration of
the clinical utility of the generalization gradient
revealed that PD patients display a broader gradient
of conditioned fear than healthy controls (Lissek
et al. 2010). Broad generalization gradients have also
been shown in GAD patients (Lissek, Kaczkurkin,
et al., 2014), thereby strengthening overgeneraliza-
tion as a pathogenic marker and highlighting over-
generalization as a putative transdiagnostic process
cutting across various anxiety disorders.
A series of fMRI studies have compared the fear
gradient between GAD patients and healthy indi-
viduals. Greenberg et al. (2013b) found a flatter
slope of negative gradients in vmPFC and somato-
sensory activity in the GAD group, but no group
differences in positive gradients in insular, ACC,
SMA and caudate activity. These results suggest
that fear overgeneralization results from a deficit in
fear regulation during interactions of fear excitation
and fear inhibition circuits along a threat-safe con-
tinuum. This conclusion was further supported by
the observation that slope coefficients of patients’
individual vmPFC gradients were positively corre-
lated with trait anxiety and depressive symptoms.
Cha et al. (2014a) found that vmPFC thickness,
vmPFC functional connectivity and vmPFC struc-
tural connectivity within the corticolimbic systems
predicted individual variability of vmPFC threat
assessment in an independent fashion. Cha et al.
(2014b) further extended these findings by com-
paring patients with GAD and healthy controls
and found a role for the human ventral tegmental
area (VTA) in the overgeneralization of fear: GAD
patients showed heightened and less discriminating
VTA reactivity to GS, as well as increased mesocor-
tical and decreasedmesohioocampal coupling. These
findings suggest that abnormalities in the VTA and
mesocorticolimbic systems may contribute to mal-
adaptive threat processing in clinical anxiety.
While classical conditioning provides a valuable
model for the etiology of anxiety disorders (e.g., Field,
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2006; Lissek et al., 2005;Mineka&Oehlberg, 2008),
whether overgeneralization of conditioned fear plays
a causal role in the etiology and maintenance of
anxiety, or is merely a correlate, awaits further evi-
dence. Prospective longitudinal research will be
especially important in this regard (e.g., Lenaert et
al., 2014), including assessing vulnerability to over-
generalization from generalization profiles obtained
earlier from the same individual, and assessing fear
generalization pre- to posttreatment.
Genetic Factors
Genetic influences on variability in conditioned fear
generalization have recently been addressed in
human genotyping research. The focus so far has
been on the involvement of the brain-derived neuro-
trophic factor (BDNF). This factor is implicated
in hippocampal-dependent learning processes, and
carriers of the BDNF MET allele of the Val66Met
BDNF genotype are characterized by reduced hip-
pocampal structure and function (e.g., Hariri et al.,
2003). BDNF has also been implicated in amygdala-
dependent fear conditioning in rodents (Monfils
et al., 2009). Moreover, variations in this poly-
morphism have been associated with anxiety-related
traits in humans (Montag et al., 2010). BDNF is
therefore a likely candidate to play a role in fear
conditioning and generalization as well.
Hajcak and colleagues (Hajcak et al., 2009)
investigated the influence of BDNF on conditioned
fear generalization in humans. Fifty-seven partici-
pants were genotyped and classified as carriers of
the Val/Val BDNF allele (n = 44; 25 female),
carriers of the Val/Met allele (n = 4; 3 female) or
carriers of the Met/Met allele (n = 3; 1 female). As
noted above, Met allele carriers are characterized
by relatively poor memory functioning as well as
reduced hippocampal functioning during memory
tasks (Hariri et al., 2003). Val/Val-carrying groups
displayed fear-potentiation of their startle reflexes
to the CS+ and generalized potentiation to GSs
along the perceptual dimension. Met-carriers, on
the other hand, had deficient fear-potentiated startle
to theCS+, indicating impaired fear conditioning (see
also Lonsdorf et al., 2010). At the same time,
however, they showed a fear-potentiated startle re-
flex to the closest generalization stimulus. A deficient
ability to elicit defensive responses to appropriate
stimuli in Met-carriers may contribute to patterns of
overgeneralization. However, Hajcak et al.’s (2009)
findings have yet to be replicatedwith a larger sample
(Greg Hajcak Proudfit, personal communication,
July 27, 2014).
Torrents-Rodas et al. (2012) included higher
numbers of Met-allele carriers and indexed gener-
alization using the uninstructed “rings of varying
size” procedure developed by Lissek et al. (2008).
Genotyping a group of 141 participants revealed
50 Met-allele carriers versus 91 carriers of the Val/
Val- or Val/Met-genotype. Unlike the Hajcak et al.
study, however, the results did not reveal significant
differences between these groups in terms of the
acquisition or generalization of conditioned fear
(potentiated startle reflex, SCR, risk ratings). These
results are in line with another study failing to
show fear acquisition deficits in Met-allele carriers
(Soliman et al., 2010), although that study did
reveal delayed fear extinction effects. Taken to-
gether, the currently available studies show highly
variable effects of the BDNF polymorphism on fear
acquisition and generalization in humans. Further
work on the role of genetic factors in fear con-
ditioning and generalization is needed before any
strong conclusions can be drawn from these small
sample sizes.
Personality Traits
There is evidence that personality traits, as measured
via questionnaires, modulate fear-conditioning
processes (Joos, Vansteenwegen, & Hermans,
2014). The strongest emphasis is on trait-anxiety,
the level of general anxiousness of an individual,
which is typically assessed with the trait scale of the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger,
1983). For example, high levels of STAI-T have been
associated with increased amygdala responsivity
during fear conditioning, and impoverished pre-
frontal cortical recruitment during conditioned fear
extinction (Indovina et al., 2011; but see Dunsmoor,
Ahs, & LaBar, 2011).
As described earlier, Haddad et al. (2012)
investigated fear conditioning in a specific proce-
dure where a face picture served as CS+ and an
angry face plus a scream as US, and a similar face
(CS1-) as well as a grey oval (CS2-) that were never
paired with the US. Fearfulness ratings, potentiated
startle reflexes and skin conductance reactivity
showed the expected fear gradient from the CS+
over CS1- to CS2-. Interestingly, this gradient was
not immediately present but developed over blocks
of conditioning trials (decreasing to CS1- and
CS2-). Moreover, the startle reflex data also
revealed faster development of the falling gradient
in participants with lower levels of STAI-T (based
on median-split analysis). Participants with higher
levels of STAI-T, on the other hand, displayed
persistent startle responses to CS1- (the similar
safety stimulus), but not to CS2- (the dissimilar
safety stimulus). Eventually, startle responses to
CS1- also dropped in this group, reaching similar
levels of differential fear responding as the low-
STAI-T group. Together, these data suggest a
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weakened ability to discriminate safety cues from
threat cues in individuals with higher levels of
STAI-T, probably driven by an overgeneralization
of fear from CS+ to CS1-.
Torrents-Rodas et al. (2013) investigated the
effect of trait-anxiety level on the conditioning and
generalization of fear. They first assessed the
STAI-T in 992 undergraduate students and selected
126 participants based on their scores, in order
to create a low-, middle-, and high-anxiety group.
They replicated the basic fear conditioning and
generalization patterns typically found (e.g., Lissek
et al., 2008), but found no robust influence of
STAI-T levels on the various fear measures (risk
ratings, fear-potentiated startle, skin conductance
reactivity). Risk ratings revealed a significant inter-
action between anxiety group and stimulus, which
was due to elevated risk ratings to the CS- and
adjacent generalization stimuli, suggesting impaired
safety learning and generalization. Torrents-Rodas
et al. (2014) examined the temporal stability of
this generalization effect across an 8-month interval
between sessions and concluded that generalization
did not differ across sessions and that a significant
proportion of individual differences in these pro-
cesses were stable over time.
Kaczkurkin and Lissek (2013) focused on the
potential relation between obsessive-compulsive
traits and overgeneralization of fear. They pre-
screened a large sample of undergraduates with the
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory–Revised (OCI-R)
and selected a group of 28 high scorers and a group
of 31 low scorers for participation. Kaczkurkin
and Lissek also measured the Threat Estimation
scale of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire, as
they hypothesized specifically a relation between
high threat estimation and fear overgeneralization.
Potentiated startle reflexes and risk ratings repli-
cated the basic fear gradient (Lissek et al., 2008).
Although there was no effect of high versus low
obsessive-compulsive traits (OCI-R), Threat Esti-
mation did modulate the fear gradient. The high
Threat Estimation group showed greater fear-
potentiated startle to ring sizes up to two units of
dissimilarity from the CS+ while the low Threat
Estimation group did not generalize the condi-
tioned fear response beyond the CS+. No group
differences were found in the risk ratings. This
study provides the first indication that fear gener-
alization may play a role in obsessive-compulsive
disorder as well.
Nonperceptual-Based Fear Generalization
Whereas perceptual-based fear generalization is
determined by the physical similarity between stimuli,
humans (in particular) are adept at generalizing from
past experience based on regularities that go beyond
physical resemblance. How nonperceptual forms of
generalization integrate with conditioned fear learn-
ing processes is an emerging area of investigation
with implications for understanding broad over-
generalization of fear characteristic of anxiety dis-
orders. Here, we review the existing research on
nonperceptual (intensity based) fear generaliza-
tion, associative forms of generalization, such as
sensory preconditioning, category based and se-
mantic fear generalization.
intensity generalization
Much of the stimulus generalization literature
focuses on similarity that can be determined by
distance between increments along a perceptual
continuum.Classic studies of stimulus generalization
in pigeons, for instance, revealed graded responses
to unreinforced colors as a function of similarity
to the CS+ along the color spectrum (Guttman &
Kalish, 1956). The shape of the generalization gra-
dient along neutral sensory dimensions like color,
tone frequency, or shape tends to be symmetrical and
peak at the trained stimulus (CS+). In contrast, the
shape of the generalization gradient along dimensions
that vary in physical intensity—like brightness or
volume—is often asymmetrical and skewed towards
generalized stimuli of high intensity (Ghirlanda &
Enquist, 2003). Although generalization along
intensity dimensions has received far less attention
than along neutral sensory dimensions, the bias to
generalize conditioned responses to stimuli of high
intensity may provide an especially useful account
for behavior in the threat domain. Take, for example,
a terrifying encounter with a particular dog. While
such an experience could lead to a general fear of all
dogs, it is unlikely that every dog encountered after
the negative experience would elicit the same degree
of fear; to an individual with a generalized fear of
dogs, a Chihuahua is probably less frightening than
a Rottweiler. Likewise, for a combat veteran who
experienced a roadside bombing, the startle reaction
to sudden noises in a safe contextmay be exaggerated
to extremely loud sounds. The intensity factor of a
generalized stimulus can be a large determinant of
fear expression, and stimuli of high intensity may
elicit even more fear than the actual threat stimulus.
The contribution between perceptual similarity
and emotional intensity on fear generalization was
examined by Dunsmoor et al. (2009) using a stim-
ulus dimension of morph increments of the same
facial identity but displaying varying intensity of
emotional expression. A face with a high degree of
fearful expression intensity and a face with a neutral
expression served as endpoints along a fear expres-
sion intensity continuum. The intermediate morph
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between fear and neutral expression intensity (a
moderately intense fearful expression) served as the
CS+ paired with an electric shock. Prior to condi-
tioning, there were no baseline differences in SCRs
as a function of the emotional expression intensity
of the face (see Figure 2, white circles). A generali-
zation test conducted after the intermediate value
was paired with shock, however, revealed a linear
gradient of SCRs with a strong response bias to
generalized morphed cues of higher emotional ex-
pression intensity (see Figure 2, black circles). Thus,
unlike fear generalization along nonintensity dimen-
sions like color or shape (e.g., Dunsmoor & LaBar,
2013; Lissek et al., 2008), conditioned fear responses
along a dimension of emotional intensity are asym-
metrical and characterized by a shift in maximal
responses to generalized stimuli of high intensity.
Put another way, stimulus intensity may in some
cases control fear generalization more than percep-
tual similarity.
In a follow-up fMRI investigation, intensity
biases were revealed in brain regions implicated in
the acquisition of conditioned fear (CS+ versus CS-)
including the insula, thalamus, and striatum
(Dunsmoor, Prince, et al., 2011). That is, activity
in these regions was enhanced to generalized stimuli
of high intensity after, but not before, fear
conditioning to a CS+ of intermediate intensity.
Functional connectivity between the amygdala and
a face-selective region in the fusiform gyrus was
also enhanced in response to a generalized stimulus
of higher intensity than the CS+, and a significant
majority of subjects misidentified this high-intensity
stimulus as the CS+ postexperimentally. This
finding suggests that implicit response biases may
occur through enhanced perceptual processing of
high-intensity approximations of a learned threat
following fear learning, which may in turn lead to
an inflated estimate of the threat stimulus following
the aversive experience. These response biases may
be an important characterization of fear expression
in anxiety disorders, particularly specific phobias,
wherein fear behaviors are elevated in response to
stimuli with exaggerated threat features and per-
ception of feared stimuli is biased. For instance,
spider phobics show a cognitive bias to misjudge a
FIGURE 2 Mean skin conductance responses (SCR) for preconditioning and the
generalization test in Dunsmoor et al. (2009) showing undifferentiated SCRs to the
stimuli before fear conditioning, but an asymmetrical linear generalization gradient
emerges during the generalization test. Reprinted by permission.
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previously encountered live spider as larger than
it actually was (Vasey et al., 2012) and height
phobics peering over a ledge overestimate height
(Teachman, Stefanucci, Clerkin, Cody, & Proffitt,
2008).
sensory preconditioning
Fear generalization following an aversive experience
is in some cases based on an association established
before the experience occurred. In sensory precondi-
tioning (SPC), for example, a prior association
between neutral stimuli (e.g., a tone and a light) in
the absence of aversive reinforcement enables the
transfer of a conditioned response after just one of
the stimuli (e.g., the light) undergoes direct condi-
tioning with the US. Higher-order conditioning
procedures such as SPC (see also second order con-
ditioning; Gewirtz & Davis, 2000) increase the
explanatory power of conditioning models of fear
and anxiety to describe how stimuli indirectly related
to the conditioning experience acquire the ability
to evoke a threat response (Declercq & De Houwer,
2009).
While much of the empirical research using SPC
is in nonhumans (Gewirtz & Davis, 2000), this
procedure has been used in a limited number of
human psychophysiological conditioning experi-
ments (e.g., White & Davey, 1989). An important
question raised by SPC is whether the strength of
the initial stimulus-stimulus association developed
during preconditioning, in the absence of reinforce-
ment, determines the strength of subsequent gen-
eralization after one of the stimuli is reinforced.
One way to address this question is to diminish the
stimulus-stimulus association by repeatedly pre-
senting one of the stimuli alone (i.e., extinction).
Taking this approach, Vansteenwegen et al. (2000)
showed that the transfer of conditioned fear be-
tween a stimulus pair is reduced if one item from
the pair is repeatedly presented alone prior to fear
conditioning. This finding suggests that SPC relies
on an intact stimulus-stimulus association to facil-
itate the transfer of conditioned learning.
The nature of the pre-association has also been
shown to enhance the effects of SPC. Dunsmoor,
White et al. (2011) showed that a conceptually
related stimulus pair (e.g., pictures of a spider and a
spider web)—as compared to a conceptually
unrelated stimulus pair (e.g., a spider and a waste
barrel)—promoted the transfer of conditioned
SCRs after one stimulus was paired with shock. In
this case, prior conceptual knowledge on the
association between spiders andwebs likely strength-
ened the interstimulus pre-association. As a conse-
quence of this conceptual pre-association,
conditioned learning more easily transferred from
the conditioned stimulus to the pre-associated
stimulus. Another group of subjects who learned a
pre-association between two pairs of conceptually
mismatched cues (e.g., a spider paired with a wasp
nest; a wasp paired with a spider web) showed
generalization to both pre-associated stimuli (i.e., the
spider and the wasp) after only one picture was
paired with shock (e.g., only the web). In this group,
generalization likely occurred via two channels: asso-
ciative learning between conceptually mismatched
cues acquired de novo (e.g., wasp and web), and
prior conceptual knowledge of the association be-
tween cues that traditionally co-occur (e.g., spider
and web). Together, these findings show that the
SPC paradigm can be used experimentally to induce
a transfer of conditioned fear in humans, and that
the strength and nature of the prior association can
determine the magnitude of fear generalization
following an aversive learning experience.
It is notable that the literature on higher-order
forms of fear conditioning in humans is scant over-
all. The lack of empirical research in this domain
is somewhat surprising given the general interest
in conditioning-based models of clinical anxiety
and the fact that these models frequently describe
overgeneralized fear expression in clinical anxiety
as arising from higher-order conditioning pro-
cesses. Foa, Steketee, and Rothbaum (1989), for
example, invoke such processes to explain combat
trauma: “Via the processes of higher order condi-
tioning and stimulus generalization, a panoply of
situations acquire fear-inducing capacities.… Thus,
sudden loud noises (a car backfiring, firecrackers
exploding)may trigger emotional responses thatwere
not present during the original trauma” (p. 157).
Similarly, higher-order conditioning is invoked when
describing generalization following rape trauma:
“Sexual activities associated with the rape trauma
become conditioned stimuli for anxiety. Via general-
ization and higher order conditioning, other sexual
activities also come to elicit fear” (p. 159). Overall,
further theoretical and empirical research using
higher-order conditioning procedures is warranted.
category-based fear generalization
The ability to consider different objects as belong-
ing to the same category allows us to infer the
properties of an unknown object based on the
known properties of categorically related objects.
In the absence of any direct knowledge, we can
predict with reasonable accuracy that, for example,
a dog we have just encountered might growl and
bark to protect its food or territory, demonstrate
social behaviors, and respond positively to rewards.
Emotionally meaningful experiences with particu-
lar stimuli can shape the nature of these predictions.
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If our experience with dogs is overwhelmingly
positive, then we may be inclined to expect a
positive response from other dogs. If, on the other
hand, we have had a frightening experience with a
dog, then we may regard similar dogs as threaten-
ing. In extreme cases, a powerful fear of a particular
object may generalize to the entire category (all
dogs or similar animals), and even to items (collars
or leashes) and to places (parks) associated with the
feared object.
Theory and research on the psychology of
categories and concepts is substantial (see
Murphy, 2002). Much of this literature explores
how humans (mainly) form equivalence classes
among perceptual categories to make inductive
generalizations (Reeve & Fields, 2001; Zentall,
Galizio, & Critchfield, 2002). Categorization re-
search cuts across a number of psychological
disciplines, including development, language, mem-
ory, and decision making, but historically has rarely
overlapped with conditioned learning. This is
perhaps not surprising given that conditioning
and stimulus generalization studies tend to incor-
porate relatively simple CSs that exist along well--
defined perceptual dimensions in order to plot
gradients of CRs as a function of physical
similarity. However, real-world fear learning rarely
occurs to simple sensory cues like lights or tones,
and instead involves complex stimuli that can be
represented at the category level and within an
elaborate associative or semantic network. As a
consequence, meaningful experiences with a real--
world object have the potential to imbue a wide
variety of other objects with significance through
myriad processes of inductive generalization de-
scribed in the categories and concepts literature.
As described throughout this review, it is critical
to infer threat potential in the absence of direct
knowledge, as potentially harmful stimuli often
assume multiple forms and vary considerably from
one encounter to the next. The ability to create
mental concepts from perceptual categories allows
us to expand the range of potentially harmful
stimuli beyond perceptual boundaries. That is, we
can incorporate our conceptual knowledge of known
objects to reason about the potential threat of novel
objects. The organization of category knowledge
may have particular influences on how information
regarding aversive events is generalized.
To explore the role of inductive generalization in
human fear conditioning, Dunsmoor et al. (2012)
constructed a novel trial-unique conditioning par-
adigm that incorporated basic level exemplars from
two superordinate categories, animals and tools, as
conditioned stimuli. For one group of subjects,
images of animals predicted shock (CS+) while tools
were safe (CS-), while another group received the
reverse contingencies (animals were safe while tools
predicted shock). Critically, each basic level image
was presented only once and subjects were not
instructed about the CS–US contingencies. Despite
variations in physical form between exemplars, and
in the absence of direct knowledge about each
stimulus (whether or not it predicted shock), it was
expected that subjects would infer threat potential
in novel category exemplars based on experiences
with related exemplars. Trial-by-trial ratings of
shock expectancy and conditioned SCRs confirmed
that subjects generalized learning to the category
level, treatingnovel exemplars from theCS+ category
as potential threats and novel exemplars from
the CS- category as safe. Functional MRI results
showed that activity in category-selective regions
in the occipitotemporal cortex was modulated as a
function of learning history (Dunsmoor, Kragel,
Martin, & LaBar, 2013). That is, lateral fusiform
gyrus (animal-preferring cortex) activity was en-
hanced in response to images of animals in subjects
for whom animals predicted shock versus subjects
for whom this category was safe; whereas activity
in the medial fusiform gyrus (tool-preferring cortex)
showed the reverse pattern of activity in these
subjects (enhanced in subjects for whom tools
predicted shock versus subjects for whom tools
were safe). Activity in the amygdala, insula, and
anterior cingulate cortex was also enhanced in
response to novel exemplars from the threat category
across both learning groups, suggesting that
category conditioning relies on regions tradition-
ally implicated in simpler forms of conditioning.
Thus, fear conditioning allows us to associate specific
items with an aversive outcome, while our ability to
represent knowledge at the category level allows us
to extend this newly learned property to categorically
related exemplars despite considerable variations in
physical form.
Another area of insight into the complexity of
human fear and anxiety is category-based induction
(Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir, 1990),
which investigates factors that promote the gener-
alizability of information at the category level.
Examples include arguments of the nature mice
have sesamoid bones [premise] therefore horses
have sesamoid bones [conclusion]. In this case, the
subject weighs the likelihood that the conclusion
follows from the premise, which is assumed to be
true, in the absence of any strong preconceived
association between the conclusion exemplar and the
property (sesamoid bones). Research on categorical
arguments shows that stimuli more representative
(or typical) of their category provide better sources
of generalization than stimuli that are not
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representative (or atypical) of their category
(Osherson et al., 1990). The example argument
concerning mice and horses, for instance, would be
considered strong because the premise exemplar is
typical of its category (e.g., mammal). In other
words, a property belonging to a representative
category member is likely to belong to other
members of that category as well. In contrast,
categorical arguments are weakened if the premise
argument contains an atypical exemplar (see Heit,
2000; Smith, Shafir, & Osherson, 1993). For
example, the argument bats have sesamoid bones
therefore mice have sesamoid bones is considered
weaker than the argumentmice have sesamoid bones
therefore bats have sesamoid bones, even though the
premise and conclusion exemplars are from the same
category (mammals). This effect is referred to as
premise-conclusion asymmetry, and provides evi-
dence that typical exemplars provide better sources
of generalization than atypical exemplars (Osherson,
et al., 1990; Rips, 1975).
Dunsmoor and Murphy (2014) adopted the
framework of category-based induction to investi-
gate whether typicality effects apply to generaliza-
tion of conditioned SCRs in humans. Two groups
were initially trained on typical CSs (e.g., mammals
including a horse, cow, and rabbit) paired with
shock, or atypical CSs (e.g., mammals including an
aardvark, armadillo, and otter) paired with shock.
Following acquisition, generalization was then
tested, without shock, to objects from the same
category but of opposing typicality; subjects trained
on typical mammals were tested to atypical
mammals, whereas subjects trained on atypical
mammals were tested to typical mammals. In the
framework of a categorical argument, the premise
could be conceptualized as a typical (or atypical) CS
predicts shock while the conclusion would be that
an atypical (or typical, respectively) CS also predicts
shock. The strength of this argument is thus
evaluated by the strength of the generalized SCR.
While both groups acquired conditioned fear to
equivalent levels, only the group trained on typical
mammals generalized responses to novel members
from the same category, providing evidence that
typical CSs provide better sources of fear general-
ization than do atypical CSs.
As the details extracted from aversive experi-
ences no doubt generate a number of premises that
will determine future behavior, the extent to which
inductive reasoning applies to the nature of human
fear and anxiety merits further empirical attention.
For example, an aversive event such as being
mugged near your apartment may lead one to
question the general safety of the neighborhood. If
you were mugged while walking through your
neighborhood in the middle of the afternoon, then
the conclusion that it is unsafe to walk in your
neighborhood at night is likely to be strengthened.
This argument contains elements of premise
typicality (you may frequently walk through your
neighborhood during the day) and plausibility
(muggings tend to occur at night rather than during
the day). If, however, you were mugged while
walking in your neighborhood late at night, then
the conclusion that the neighborhood is unsafe in
the middle of the afternoon may be weaker, since
the premise is more atypical and the conclusion less
plausible. We can speculate that extremely fright-
ening or traumatic experiences likely override
inductive or analytical judgments, rendering even
atypical premises sufficient to induce widespread
generalizations regarding the threat potential of
other stimuli or situations.
semantic fear generalization
Early studies of nonperceptual stimulus generali-
zation in humans used semantic stimuli (words)
(Branca, 1957; Maltzman, 1977; Razran, 1939).
For instance, participants would be conditioned to
a word (e.g., PLANT) by pairing the presentation
of the word with a US, and then tested on
semantically related words (e.g., STEM) or unrelated
words (e.g., MUSIC) (Maltzman, Langdon, Pendery,
&Wolff, 1977). In some cases, the conditioned SCR
would generalize between semantically related, but
not unrelated word pairs; but the results from
semantic conditioning experiments tended to be
noisy and were often observed only in subjects who
could verbalize the experimental contingencies (see
Maltzman et al., 1977). Much of the theoretical
interest in semantic conditioning and generalization
concerned the acquisition of language, and few
contemporary studies of human fear conditioning
incorporate purely semantic stimuli.
Early researchers had come to the conclusion that
simple S-R mechanisms alone may not be sufficient
to account for these complex generalization phe-
nomena along nonformal continua, and they sug-
gested a key role for “complex thought processes” in
explaining these effects (e.g.,Maltzman, Langdon,&
Feeney, 1970). Several other researchers began to
hone in language processes themselves as underlying
this complex form of fear generalization (Eisen,
1954; Mednick & Wild, 1962; Mink, 1963). It is
surprising that so few researchers have followed
up on this interesting line of enquiry in recent years,
and that no study of semantic generalization has
included an instrumental response (i.e., avoidance)
component.
A recent study revisited the near-forgotten seman-
tic generalization paradigm (e.g., Eisen, 1954) in an
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attempt to examine the generalization of fear and
avoidance (see Feather, 1965, for a review). Boyle,
Roche, Dymond, and Hermans (2014) first exposed
participants to fear conditioning in which one word
was designated CS+ (e.g., broth) by pairing it with
the presentation of shock, and another word was
designated CS- (e.g., assist) and never followed by
shock. In the next phase, an avoidance response (a
space bar press) was established for the CS+, which
cancelled the presentation of the scheduled shock. In
the generalization test phase, words semantically
related to the CS+ (e.g., soup) and CS- (e.g., help)
were presented in the absence of shock.Differences in
levels of avoidance, SCR and US expectancy ratings
were all significant across the CS+ andCS- stimuli, as
well as across their semantically generalized coun-
terparts. Importantly, Boyle et al. found that the
three measures did not covary reliably. That
is, higher levels of avoidance responding were
not associated with higher SCRs but were
associated with higher shock expectancies for
the semantically related stimuli only. Moreover,
rates of avoidance of the US were not correlated
well with expectancies of the US. Despite these
interesting covariances among the dependent
measures, the generalized words reliably pro-
duced US expectancies, SCRs, and avoidance
responses consistent with their semantic relation
to the CS+ or CS-.
Nonperceptual Fear Generalization: The Role
of Symbolic Generalization
In the work reviewed so far, the role of perceptual
and nonperceptual features in the generalization
of conditioned fear and avoidance has relied on
preexperimentally acquired learning about repre-
sentational features and intact conceptual knowl-
edge structures to explain how potential threats
come to take on multiple, generalized forms. For
instance, category-based fear generalization draws
on existing conceptual knowledge (e.g., of animals
and tools) to modulate and explain how related
object concepts come to elicit fear (Dunsmoor
et al., 2013). There are several assumptions under-
lying research of this kind, such as an acknowl-
edgment that modulation of generalized fear by
viewing images of objects or categories activates
similar representations in different participants and
that the nature and extent of individual differences
in learning history with object concepts may be
overlooked (or is deemed irrelevant) in generating
the observed effects. While these assumptions are
not necessarily limitations, it may be salutary to
highlight alternative, functionally oriented ap-
proaches to fear generalization that emphasize
both prediction and influence over the phenomena
of interest—goals met through synthesizing de
novo conditioning with methods of establishing
concept-like associations or relations between arbi-
trary stimuli.
According to this approach, a potentially prom-
ising means of further understanding fear general-
ization involves verbal relations, such as stimulus
equivalence relations, as a way of preexperimen-
tally establishing the relevant “concepts” (Dymond
& Roche, 2009). Research on verbal relations has
shown that when language-able humans are taught
a series of interrelated discriminations involving
physically dissimilar (arbitrary) stimuli, the stimuli
involved often become related to each other in ways
not explicitly trained (Sidman, 1994). To illustrate,
if choosing Stimulus X in the presence of Stimulus
A is taught (i.e., A-X), and choosing Stimulus Y in
the presence of Stimulus A (i.e., A-Y) is also taught,
it is likely that untrained relations will emerge
between X and A, Y and A (“symmetry”), X and Y,
and Y and X (“equivalence”), in the absence of any
feedback.When this occurs, a stimulus equivalence
relation is said to have formed among the relata
(Dymond & Roche, 2013; Hayes & Hayes, 1992).
The emergence of untrained verbal relations such
as these may, it is claimed, help explain the patterns
of indirect, nonperceptually based fear generaliza-
tion often seen in anxiety disorders and which arise
in the apparent absence of a conditioning history
with the feared object or event (Dymond & Roche,
2009; Hermans & Baeyens, 2013; Hermans et al.,
2013). Indeed, the challenge in accounting for
complex patterns of generalized fear present in
clinical anxiety means that the “the powerful
human capacity for abstract representation creates
special problems in translating the rules of stimulus
generalization worked out in animals. Fear and
avoidance spread in animals from one context to
another based on simple sensory cues. In humans,
this spread may be on the basis of complex
feelings” (Marks, 1987, p. 234). This spread or
symbolic generalization of fear along arbitrary
features or stimulus relations may account for
instances of fear and avoidance that occur when,
for instance, snake-phobic clients hear the word
“snake” and other unrelated stimuli, such as the
word “reptile,” pictures of snakes, names of dif-
ferent types of snakes, a real snake, and places
where snakes might be found, all of which may
occasion fear and avoidance (Foa & Kozak, 1986;
Lang, 1985). In effect, while the original fearful CS
may have been directly conditioned, the general-
ization of fear and avoidance responses often
occurs along verbal (i.e., symbolic) dimensions and
can include a host of indirectly related, arbitrary
stimuli.
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symbolic fear generalization
Research on the symbolic generalization of fear is
growing, with early demonstration work tending
to employ single-case research designs with small
sample sizes (e.g., Dougher, Augustson, Markham,
Greenway, &Wulfert, 1994; Valverde, Luciano, &
Barnes-Holmes, 2009). Recently, Vervoort, Vervliet,
Bennett, and Baeyens (2014) adapted the proce-
dures of Dougher et al. (1994) to examine symbolic
generalization of fear and extinction using contem-
porary between-groups design standards and sta-
tistical analyses. Vervoort et al. (2014) first trained
and tested participants to form two, four-member
stimulus equivalence relations consisting entirely
of arbitrary line drawings (i.e., A1-B1-C1-D1 and
A2-B2-C2-D2; labeled with alphanumerics for
purposes of clarity—participants were not exposed
to these labels). Next, one member of the first
relational class (B1) was established as CS+ by
pairing it with shock, and a member of the second
class (B2) was established as CS-. Symbolic
generalization was then tested with presentations of
the indirectly related members of each class, in the
absence of shock. As predicted, conditioned fear,
measured via SCR and online shock-expectancy
ratings, generalized to the other members of class 1
(C1, D1) but not to class 2 (C2, D2). Extinction of
conditioned fear was also shown to generalize to the
other, indirectly related members, while extinguish-
ing a generalized member did not reduce fear of the
original CS+. Vervoort et al.’s findings are significant
because they demonstrate the generalization and
extinction of conditioned fear responses to stimuli
symbolically associated with the CS+ via relational
classes established intra-experimentally using unfa-
miliar, arbitrary stimuli (Dymond & Roche, 2009;
Hermans et al., 2013).
symbolic avoidance generalization
Avoidance behavior is an instantiation of fear
(Beckers et al., 2013) and plays a key role in the
maintenance of anxiety (Barlow, 2002; Mineka,
1979). Avoidance may become debilitating and
lead to impaired social functioning and, because of
this, it is often the sole target of therapeutic change.
While there is evidence for perceptual generaliza-
tion of avoidance (Lommen et al., 2010; van Meurs
et al., 2014), extending the analysis of symbolic
generalization to include instances of avoidance
is important in developing contemporary accounts
of the emergence of clinical anxiety (Field, 2006;
Friman,Hayes,&Wilson, 1998;Mineka&Zinbarg,
2006; Rachman, 1977).
The first supporting evidence for this approach
comes from Augustson and Dougher (1997), who
trained and tested participants for the formation of
two, four-member stimulus equivalence relations
(A1-B1-C1-D1 and A2-B2-C2-D2) and then used a
differential fear conditioning procedure to establish
B1 as CS+ and BS as CS-, respectively. During
a subsequent avoidance-training phase, shock
could be avoided by completing a fixed-ratio (FR)
20-response requirement in the presence of B1,
while shock was never scheduled to follow presen-
tations of B2. Symbolic generalization of avoidance
was then tested, in the absence of shock, with
presentations of the indirectly related stimuli not
present during avoidance training. Findings showed
that all eight participants emitted the avoidance
response to C1 and D1 but not to C2 and D2,
indicating that they transferred the directly trained
avoidance schedule response from B1 to the sym-
bolically related C1 and D1 stimuli without further
training.
Augustson and Dougher (1997) were the first
to show the symbolic-based generalized avoidance
of stimuli that had no direct relational history
with aversive events. Since then, Dymond, Schlund,
Roche, Whelan, Richards, and Davies (2011) have
extended these findings with a larger sample size to
a similar operant avoidance paradigm involving
aversive images and sounds as USs, while Dymond,
Schlund, Roche, De Houwer, and Freegard (2012)
showed that levels of symbolic generalization
resemble those seen when avoidance is acquired
indirectly, such as through verbal instructions
(Rachman, 1977). Dymond, Roche, Forsyth,
Whelan, and Rhoden (2007, 2008) showed that
the symbolic generalization of avoidance may be
transformed in accordance with relations of
“sameness” (i.e., equivalence) and “opposition.”
After training to establish two abstract shapes as
contextual cues for same and opposite, respectively,
the cues were presented with arbitrary nonsense
stimuli and participants taught the following
relations: same cue-A1-B1, same cue-A1-C1, oppo-
site cue-A1-B2, and opposite cue-A1-C2. These
relations lead to the following untrained relations:
B1-C1 are same, B2-C2 are same, B1-C2 are
opposite, and B1-C1 are opposite. Fear and
avoidance responses conditioned to one of these
stimuli may then alter or transform the functions of
other, untrained relations in terms of "same" and
"opposite." Dymond et al. (2007, 2008) exposed
participants to a signaled avoidance task, during
which responding in the presence of the stimulus B1
cancelled a scheduled US presentation. Another
stimulus, B2, was never followed by the US. Then,
participants were tested with presentations of C1
and C2, in the absence of the US. Findings showed
that consistent avoidance responses were made in
the presence of C1 but not C2 (because C1 is the
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same as B1, whereas C2 is the opposite), thus
demonstrating the symbolic generalization of
avoidance in accordance with complex relational
networks of same/opposite (see also Bennett,
Hermans, Dymond, Vervoort, & Baeyens, 2014;
Gannon, Roche, Kanter, Forsyth, & Linehan, 2011;
Roche, Kanter, Brown, Dymond, & Fogarty, 2008).
These studies illustrate how verbal relations of
equivalence, sameness and opposition, established
intra-experimentally, come to act as conduits by
which fear and avoidance responses so readily gen-
eralize and go on to alter or transform the functions
of other, indirect stimuli or situations. In so doing,
the process of symbolic generalization is said to
mimic the relational basis by which clinically rele-
vant fear and anxiety comes to be acquired and
maintained. It shows how semantic-like, symbolic
categories may be readily formed in language-able
humans and how “meaning” or, in this instance,
conditioned fear and avoidance functions, alter and
spread to networks of related stimuli. The relational
basis of this view of psychopathology forms the
basis of relational frame theory (RFT; Dymond &
Roche, 2013; Dymond, Roche, & Bennett, 2013),
a functional contextual account of human language
and cognition that informs several third-wave be-
havior therapies such as acceptance and commitment
therapy (Hayes, Levin, Plumb-Vilardaga, Villate, &
Pistorello, 2013).
According to RFT, excessive avoidance occurs
in the presence of a wide range of stimuli and
situations based on the actual and, more often
than not, inferred presence of the aversive event. It
follows that groups that already differ on the basis
of individual differences variables may show dif-
ferent levels of symbolic generalization of avoid-
ance. Dymond, Schlund, Roche, and Whelan
(2014) showed that high spider-fearful individuals
exhibited greater levels of symbolic generalization
of avoidance than low spider-fearful individuals
and also met avoidance learning criteria quicker.
These findings highlight the symbolic basis of dif-
ferential levels of clinically relevant avoidance and
support an RFT understanding of the acquisition of
excessive avoidance.
Clinical Implications of Human Fear
Generalization Research
Core differences between "normal/adaptive" fears
and pathology such as phobias are often conceptu-
alized in terms of fear intensity and avoidance.
Pathological fear is considered to be more intense
than normal fear, or at least more than the situation
would reasonably require. From this perspective,
dog phobia is not just being afraid of dogs, but
being severely afraid, to the extent that it impairs
normal functioning and prompts avoidance of dogs
and of the possibility of encountering dogs. Even
though intensity and avoidance might be important
in discriminating both types of fear and the tran-
sition between the two, we believe that generaliza-
tion is probably even more central in this respect.
Given the clinical importance of fear generaliza-
tion, it is surprising that this phenomenon has,
historically, received so little empirical attention.
Nevertheless, the existing research already reveals
elements that are of clinical importance. First, there
are important implications with respect to assess-
ment. All treatments of anxiety disorders require an
in-depth assessment, which includes an extensive
analysis of the crucial stimuli and their conditioning
history. This provides direct input for treatment
(e.g., exposure techniques, cognitive restructuring).
One of the important conclusions of generalization
research is that fear can be elicited by stimuli that
were actually never involved in a conditioning
experience. Moreover, research on symbolic gener-
alization indicates that (a) fear can be elicited by
stimuli that do not bear a perceptual relation to the
original CSs, (b) fear can be elicited by stimuli that
were never associated with the original US, and
(c) under some circumstances fear elicited by
generalization stimuli can be more intense than fear
elicited by the original CSs (Dougher, Hamilton,
Fink, & Harrington, 2007). This illustrates why
assessment of relevant fear stimuli and their condi-
tioning history is not always possible or fruitful: the
pathway from current fear stimuli to the original
conditioning events is simply too complex.Relying on
obvious and salient features of fear stimuli, as
reported by a client therefore, might not always be
sufficient and a more in-depth and complex analysis
might be necessary. In effect, the phenomenon of
nonperceptual fear generalization helps make clear
why conditioning experiences are not always easily
traceable in the clinical context (Muris,Merckelbach,
de Jong, & Ollendick, 2002; Poulton & Menzies,
2002).
A more complete understanding of nonpercep-
tual generalization processes is required before we
can draw conclusions regarding how this process
should inform the use of traditional therapeutic
procedures. For example, it might make a difference
whether in exposure treatments we expose clients
to a limited or broad array of fear stimuli. Research
by Vervoort et al. (2014) indicates that extinction
of the original CS spreads to the generalization
stimuli, while the reverse is not necessarily true
(cf. Roche et al., 2008). In the absence of concrete
information regarding the original CS, use of a
broad array of generalized stimuli may represent a
next best option. However, Vervliet et al. (2005)
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suggested that extinction with generalization stim-
uli might lead to more extensive return of fear,
compared to extinction with the original CS,
where it can be identified. These observations are
relevant to clinical practice because exposure
treatment is frequently conducted using generali-
zation stimuli precisely because feared stimuli are
unavailable (e.g., the actual dog involved in the
biting incident) or inaccessible. Against this back-
ground, several of the authors on this review are
beginning to investigate the conditions under
which extinction using generalized fear stimuli
might be more effective and less vulnerable to return
of fear.
It is also worth considering fear generalization in
the framework of the highly influential Foa and
Kozak (1986) model of informational processing
and fear networks. While not a direct model for
stimulus generalization, per se, the notion that fear
is represented within informational networks, or
memory structures, is a dictum of many exposure
therapies that could also explain overgeneralization
in anxiety disorders. This model views fear in
terms of a memory structure with interconnected
informational and response elements (e.g., fight-
or-flight), and information that partially overlaps
with a memory within this network can be suf-
ficient to activate a fear response. For example,
a victim of an assault who later spots a person
resembling their assailant will have an automatic
fear response through activation in this network.
In this way, the model describes fear generaliza-
tion based on pattern completion, as detailed by
more contemporary models of fear generalization
(Lissek, Bradford, et al., 2014; Lissek, Kaczkurkin,
et al., 2014).
Within the RFT tradition, one response to the
seemingly autocatalytic nature of fear and avoid-
ance generalization is to conceptualize the process
of extinction as fundamentally limited for thera-
peutic purposes. Precisely because of the ubiquity
of language and the constant social reinforcement
of symbolic relations that support fear generaliza-
tion (e.g., pairing of the word “poison” with
“spider” in the vernacular), it may be inevitable
that stimuli associated with fear and anxiety will
be encountered at some point in the future. Con-
sequently, the ACT approach (Hayes, Stroshal, &
Wilson, 2011), which arose out of the relational
frame perspective on human learning, and focuses
on the problem of loosening the dominance of
verbal relations over the generalization process
itself. For example, one technique known as
“defusion” (Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig,
2004) teaches the client how to perform other
instrumental responses in the presence of fear stimuli
and to thereby broaden the response functions of
fear stimuli rather than narrow them. In effect, the
multiplicity of response functions that get established
for fear stimuli in the therapeutic setting (e.g., paying
attention to its color, what the word sounds like,
what it rhymes with, the feelings it creates in the
body, etc.) compete with the normally dominant fear
and avoidance functions and reduce the probability
of fear and avoidance emerging on each occasion.
Moreover, clients are taught how to respond to other
fear stimuli in the same way in the future (e.g., notice
what the word sounds like, notice the object’s color,
and so on), so the skill of defusing the literal and
dominant meaning of stimuli (e.g., “a spider means
I must run away") itself becomes generalized. In
this way the ACT approach parallels many of the
mindfulness approaches that have emerged in recent
years, but with the difference that is based on a
behavioral approach to understanding how verbal
processes underlie the generalization phenomenon
and how undermining fear generalization in the long
term will have to involve undermining the negative
effects of verbal processes themselves. Put simply,
generalization through exposure narrows the range
of response functions (namely fear and avoidance)
for an ever-narrowing range of stimuli (i.e., the
client is less afraid and avoidant of what is now a
very small range of stimuli). Defusion, on the other
hand, broadens the range of response functions for
an ever-increasing range of stimuli. The fear and
avoidance functions are left perfectly intact, but the
range of response options to those stimuli has been
increased.
The generalization research reviewed here also
points to the crucial importance of prevention (as
compared to treatment). Ideally, one would be able
to prevent the generalization of fear, thus averting
the development of pathology. Preventative inter-
ventions can be conducted prior to exposure to
probable fear conditioning experiences. This might
be productive in those cases where such experiences
are highly probable, such as in soldiers deployed for
war interventions or during the training of fire
fighters. In other cases, such interventions could be
used immediately after acquisition, in the time
window before (or if otherwise impossible, during)
generalization. For example, certain interventions
might prevent the bullied 9-year-old from develop-
ing social phobia. Given that discrimination is the
flipside of generalization, such techniques could
include discrimination training with relevant stim-
uli or situations for which it makes sense to be
afraid and distinguished from other perceptually
or symbolically related events (see Vervliet et al.,
2010a). More research in this area, including the
development of effective techniques, is warranted.
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conclusions and future directions
Historically, research on perceptual and nonper-
ceptual (symbolic) generalization has been rooted
in two quite separate research traditions. Most of
the work on perceptual generalization has been
conducted within a Pavlovian conditioning frame-
work, which typically adopts a cognitive view. It
is assumed that conditioned fear responding and
generalization are based on associations between
representations in memory and on feature overlap
with other memory representations. Such theoriz-
ing and mental constructs are largely absent within
the behavioristic-functional framework from which
research on symbolic generalization originated
(Dymond & Roche, 2009). Both domains have
been defined within different (and often opposing)
meta-theoretical traditions, and to some extent
continue to exist independently, with contrasting
philosophical worldviews and research published in
different journals and presented at different confer-
ences. This lack of communication is unfortunate,
and only recently have researchers from both
domains engaged in more extensive communication
and collaboration. The present article is the result of
such an endeavor. We believe there is much to be
gained for a translational understanding of fear
generalization and anxiety disorders from research
that combines both perspectives; this also necessitates
an account of how both meta-theoretical traditions
can co-exist and learn from each other (see De
Houwer, 2011; De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, &
Moors, 2013).
Development at the theoretical level would also
help integration and further development of the
clinical procedures that stem from both traditions.
All too often, therapies and techniques for the
treatment of anxiety disorders that come from a
cognitive/Pavlovian conditioning perspective, like
exposure (Craske et al., 2008) and those from a
functional perspective (e.g., Eifert, Forsyth, &
Hayes, 2014) are viewed as hardly commensurable
or only compatible at the level of day-to-day clinical
practice. Here as well, much can be gained from
development and integration across theoretical
levels.
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